Like all human beings, migrants may have a concern about their prestige or social status. In an imperfect information set-up, unsuccessful migrants might accept a worsening of their living conditions and send back home large amounts of remittances only in order to increase their prestige in the eyes of the left home family and friends. In some cases, successful migrants can signal their favorable economic situation by remitting an even larger amount. The game presents various equilibria that di¤er with respect to the proportion and nature of the migrants who sacri…ce consumption opportunities to status revealing actions.
Introduction
In 2008, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), there were more than 200 million estimated international migrants in the world (IOM, 2008) . They comprise 3% of the global population (United Nations, 2006) ; taken altogether, they would constitute the 5 th most populous country in the world (US Census Bureau, 2008) .
The New Economics of Labor Migration analyses migration as an implicit contractual arrangement between the migrant and his family (Stark & Levhari, 1982; Stark & Bloom, 1985; Stark & Lucas, 1988) . The migrant and his family enter such exchange because they expect to be better o¤ with the contractual arrangement than without it. Numerous authors have pointed out that social norms referring to what should be seen as the "good"behavior of migrants can help enforcing such implicit contractual arrangements, in the absence of institutional mechanisms to deter violation (the legal powers of the state for instance).
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If we were to dig deeper, implicit familial contractual arrangements can be enforced mainly because migrants retain a strong degree of identi…cation, allegiance, and social connectedness with their origin community. Social pressure is sometimes reinforced by the di¤erent threats and sanctions that the family can undertake against the "deviant" migrant: ostracism, denial of present and future family solidarity, loss of rights to inherit family land or real estate property, loss of rights to bene…t from the care of the village community for one's elderly parents or younger children (Poirine, 1997) .
Transfers of funds from the migrant to his left-home family, or remittances, are one important element of these implicit contractual arrangements. In 2007, remittance ‡ows from these migrants are estimated at US$ 337 billion worldwide, US$ 251 billion of which went to developing countries (World Bank, 2008) . They can occur for various motives. Rapoport & Docquier (2006) draw an almost exclusive list: altruism, exchange of services and investment, migrant's strategy, an implicit family loan arrangement, and/or an implicit family insurance arrangement.
One other motive, less developed by the existing literature, has been put forward by Stark & 1 Philpott (1968) for instance, studying the remitting behavior of Montserratian migrants in Britain, shows how expectations over migrants, namely their duty to remit to their families left at home, are taught to children at a fairly early age (through stories told to children over "good" and "bad" migrants, through the importance given to the mail collected by the children themselves...) Lucas (1988) : they argue that migrants, like all human beings, seek to earn themselves a good reputation; by sending remittances, they aim at gaining social status and prestige in their origin community. In this set-up, a high amount of remittance can signal the success of the migrant in his new country, and thus the accomplishment of his "mission". In turn, such positive success assessment by his intimate circle of friends and family is a source of satisfaction for the migrant himself. This "status-seeking" argument can be easily accommodated with the logic of a strong social pressure set on migrants by the left-home family and community. Hence, in a study on Soninke labor migration, Azam & Gubert (2005) show that remittances from migrants not only aim to secure the well-being of those left behind but also the pride of the clan. In the same line of reasoning, Neveu & Copans (1993, p.246) , in their monograph about Bangladeshi in London, argue that there is a very strong social pressure on the migrant visiting his origin country to show his success to his family and home community through ostentatious consumption behavior. Fatou Diome (2003) tells the same story in her novel on the dark side of migration, where an extremely poor Senegalese migrant living in Paris, going back to his home village, spends a lot, hides his real migrant living condition and describes France as heaven on earth.
While the idea according to which social norms are powerful mechanisms to enforce informal contracts between migrants and the origin community is an established result of existing literature on international migrations, so far the impact of status-seeking behavior on the total amount of remittances has received much less attention. This paper analyses the remitting strategy of statusseeking migrants in a model where residents have imperfect information about migrants'economic success abroad. Status is connected here to the perception by the origin community of the migrant's economic situation. The methodology builds on the classical signaling game by Spence (1973 Spence ( , 2002 . Migrants di¤er according to the income they earn in the host country, and their income is private information. They send back home remittances for altruistic motives but also to signal their economic situation. We show that, in some cases, in equilibrium unsuccessful migrants can accept a deterioration of their living standards and remit a relatively high amount only to make their family believe that they have succeeded, and thus retain a high social status. However, such a generalized strategy is detrimental to successful migrants. Indeed, if unsuccessful migrants remit the same amount as the successful ones, members of the local community cannot rule out the possibility that a migrant who sends large remittances is actually unsuccessful, thus the prestige of successful migrants is to some extent deteriorated. In some circumstances, successful migrants are prompted to remit an extremely high amount, only to signal without any ambiguity their professional success in the host country, and secure their high status in their home community.
A Nash equilibrium of this game is a situation where migrants adopt their optimal remitting strategy given the residents'beliefs about their success in the host country, and residents'beliefs are correct given the optimal strategies implemented by the migrants. Depending on the various parameters, the game presents several types of equilibria, where migrants play either pure or mixed strategies. Besides one separating equilibrium where remitting strategies unambiguously signal the type of migrant, in general migrants tend to remit too much as compared with the perfect information case. The counterpart of this large ‡ow of remittances is a relative self-impoverishment of migrants in host countries. Most worrying are situations where unsuccessful migrants remit more than the perfect information amount, thus sacri…cing personal development opportunities.
For a wide range of parameter values, the game presents multiple equilibria: two or more equilibria are feasible and which one actually arises depends on equilibrium beliefs. Since systems of beliefs can di¤er from one ethnic group to another, remitted amounts and remitting strategies can vary for otherwise similar migrants living in the same developed country. Several policy implications can be inferred from the model; we will focus on those that aim at protecting the less successful migrants.
Our study can be related to early economic literature about the impact of social status on consumption and e¤ort choices, such as conspicuous consumption put forward by Veblen (1899) , the importance of relative consumption as shown by Duesenberry (1952) or "positional goods" de…ned by Hirsch (1976) as those goods whose consumption is perceived as having a positive impact on status.
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In a recent study, Hopkins & Tornienko (2004) work out a conspicuous 3 See Weiss & Fershtman (1998) for a review of the literature. consumption model that can be related to our own analysis. Individuals who care about their status, di¤er in their income and this income is not directly observable. An individual's status is therefore proxied by his rank in the distribution of the consumption of one positional good, and this distribution can be observed. It turns out that in the Nash equilibrium, individuals would consume more of the conspicuous good and less of the other goods than in a perfect information set-up. The model can be easily transposed to the remittance case, by interpreting remittances as a special positional good. In this case too, in equilibrium migrants are expected to send back home too much money as compared to the perfect information case. At di¤erence with this paper, in our analysis status is not related to the rank in the distribution of remittances, but to the expected income conditional upon the remitted amount. In our framework, the rank in the distribution of remittances cannot be a correct measure of their status: indeed, in some hybrid Nash equilibria, poor and rich migrants remit the same amount.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic assumptions. Section 3 de…nes and analyzes the properties of the various equilibria. The …nal section presents the conclusion.
The model

Main assumptions
The model is cast as a game between the migrant, who decides on the remitted amount, and the local community (or residents) who must make the best expectations about the migrant's success. Lindbeck (1997) and Oxoby (2003) , we assume that the migrant's utility related to consumption (personal and family) and his utility connected to social status are additively separable. We thus write the migrant's utility function as:
The …rst term of this expression, u(C; T ); takes into account his preferences over his own consumption C and his family's consumption from transfers T ; the function u(; ) is assumed to present standard neoclassical properties: it is smoothly increasing in C and T , with u C @u(C;T ) @C > 0, and u T @u(C;T ) @T > 0; and it is strictly quasiconvave (thus entailing strictly convex indi¤erence curves). In addition, we assume that C and T behave as normal goods: should the migrant's income increase, he would both consume and transfer more
In the second term, E [sjT ] is the income of the migrant such as expected by his origin community. Expected income is considered to be a good measure of the migrant's status or prestige in his origin country;
given that the transfer T can convey some information about the true income of the migrant, we wrote this expectation conditional on it. The positive parameter (with > 0) is the weight the migrant attaches to his social status in his origin community.
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Thus, the migrant i 2 fL; Hg determines the remitted amount according to the following optimization program:
or, including the constraint in the objective,
Finally, let us denote the consumption utility of a migrant earning s i and transferring T j (it can be the optimal amount or not), i.e. u(s i T j ; T j ); by the more compact form u ij : Then, the overall utility of a migrant earning the wage s i and remitting the amount T j is:
The perfect information set-up
In the problem under scrutiny, the local community knows the income distribution, but does not know the income of a given migrant. The perfect information set-up, where income is public information, provides us with a useful benchmark. In this context, a migrant's utility function
, and, given that s i is constant, his optimization program can be written in the simpler version:
We denote by T L (respectively T H ) the optimal amount of remittances in the perfect information set-up, for a migrant earning the low income s L (respectively s H ). In Figure 2 , the optimal choice is represented as the point A (respectively B). This perfect information optimal amount is implicitly de…ned by the equality between the marginal utilities of consumption and remittances:
6 Alternatively, we can assume that, ex-ante, residents expect the migrant to be succesful, i.e. expect him to earn the high wage s H . The migrant then incurs a cost if the others think he failed. The migrant's utility function would then be:
s H . It leads to the same optimization program.
Following the assumption according to which remittances are a normal good, s
With our compact notation (Eq. 3), in the perfect information set-up, given that the migrant's income is public information, the optimal utility level of the successful migrant then is: U (s H T H ; T H ) = u HH + s H , and the optimal utility level of the unsuccessful migrant is:
According to the de…nition of the optimal remitted amount, we know that:
In the following we will take into account only the case where the optimal transfer of the successful migrant, T H , is lower than the income of the unsuccessful migrant, s
migrants who did not succeed in the host country thus are able to remit T H , if they wish. Given that T H is an increasing function of s H ; this condition is tantamount to assuming that the income
In the opposite case, if unsuccessful migrants cannot copy the strategy of successful migrants, neither imitation nor signaling are possible and the problem would become trivial.
The imperfect information set-up
We now turn back to the interesting case where the local community has no perfect information about the migrant's economic situation.
The decision tree
In this case, the remitted amount T j can convey some additional information about the migrant's income. Then, a migrant who failed in the host country could be tempted to use remittances strategically, in order to manipulate residents'expectations. Indeed, under certain conditions, a migrant earning s L may choose to remit the same amount T H as a successful migrant in order to induce his family and origin community into thinking that he actually succeeded.
Let us denote by q the proportion of migrants earning the low wage s L who decide to implement 7 For instance, with Cobb-Dougals preferences, it can easily be shown that the condition T H < s L requires that:
Migrant' s payoff If unsuccessful migrants try to mimic the successful ones, then there is also scope for a signaling strategy for the latter. Indeed, according to the traditional argument (see Spence, 2002) , under certain conditions, some successful migrants may …nd it worthy to signal their success without ambiguity by remitting an even higher amount, denoted by T S (with T S > T H ). Here T S should be seen as the (smallest) amount of remittances, in the range of feasible strategies for successful migrants, that is too costly (or impossible) to be implemented by unsuccessful migrants. Hence, unsuccessful migrants would never play T S :
Let us denote by the proportion of migrants earning the high wage s H who decide to signal themselves (T S and will be determined later on). The sequence of decisions goes like this: First step, Nature decides whether the migrant is The residents'equilibrium beliefs can be written as success probabilities contingent upon the observed remitted amount:
and with Pr s
Thus, in equilibrium, the expected value of the migrant's income, conditional on his remitted amount, is:
8 It is never interesting for a successful migrant to remit the low amount T L : not only his consumption utility would decline, but also he makes his home community believe that he failed. 9 Pr s H jT H is not de…ned in this case where T H is not an equilibrium strategy, i.e. if q = 0 and = 1. In Section 3 we suggest how to analyze these out-of-equilibrium beliefs. 
For sure, no poor migrant would undertake a remitting strategy that brings him a utility level lower than this one. Hence, successful migrants who want to make sure that no poor migrant will copy them (even if this strategy makes residents believe that he is rich), must remit an amount
Hence, if there is one T j that veri…es the condition (9) with equality, all transfers bigger than this critical one will satisfy the condition. Then, a possible signaling amount would be the lowest transfer verifying condition (9) and is implicitly de…ned by:
Let us denote the solution of the former equation byT :
Thus, the remitted amount that unambiguously signals a migrant as being successful is: 
The di¤erent equilibria
A Nash equilibrium of this game is de…ned as a situation in which each migrant plays his optimal strategy given the residents'beliefs, and the residents'beliefs are correct given the optimal strategy of the migrants.
We can then distinguish between three types of equilibria: separating equilibria where migrants' strategies perfectly reveal their type, pooling equilibria where all migrants implement the same strategy and thus no information about the type of migrants can be inferred from their remitting behavior, and hybrid equilibria where migrants play Nash mixed strategies and their strategies carry some but not full information about their type.
This section presents the conditions of existence of the various equilibria and their properties.
Separating equilibria
The Low separating equilibrium (trivial)
This trivial equilibrium is similar to the perfect information equilibrium. Thus unsuccessful migrants do not …nd it worthwhile to manipulate information (q = 0) and successful migrants do not …nd it worthwhile to signal themselves ( = 0). Given residents'beliefs, income expectations
Migrants'optimal strategies depend on their payo¤s (Figure 1 ). This equilibrium exists if the following conditions are ful…lled:
The latter condition being always true, this equilibrium exists if:
The total remitted amount then is similar to the perfect information total; it amounts to:
linearly increasing with the frequency of successful migrants, p.
The High separating equilibrium
In this equilibrium all successful migrants …nd it worthwhile to signal themselves by adopting their expensive T S strategy ( = 1), and all poor migrants follow the T L strategy (q = 0). In equilibrium, none of them would follow the strategy 
10 Turning now to successful migrants, this equilibrium exists if the following su¢ cient condition is ful…lled:
The total remitted amount then is: T high = pT S + (1 p) T L , also linearly increasing with the frequency of successful migrants, p.
1 0 We show here that equilibria where all successful migrants signal themselves ( = 1) and some or all unsuccessful migrants manipulate information (q > 0) are impossible.
The Pooling equilibrium
In this equilibrium all migrants choose the same remitting strategy, i.e. all remit the intermediate amount T
H . If all unsuccessful migrants …nd it worthwhile to manipulate information, we have q = 1 and, since successful migrants do not signal themselves, we have = 0. Income expectations
This equilibrium exists if the following necessary conditions are ful…lled:
or, in the more compact form:
A non-empty interval for s exists only if:
Thus, this equilibrium can exist only if the probability of success is larger than a critical threshold, that we denote byp. Indeed, the stigma of failure should be larger in a context where most of the other migrants are successful; hence the incentive to manipulate information should be the strongest in this environment.
The total remitted amount then is: T pool = T H , independent from the probability of success, p.
If in this equilibrium unsuccessful migrants seem to be better o¤ than in the perfect information 
Hybrid equilibria
In a hybrid equilibrium at least one type of migrants plays a mixed strategy. Hence, at least one equilibrium condition is a zero trade-o¤ condition, according to which the migrant is indi¤erent between playing one strategy or another.
Hybrid equilibrium A: partial manipulation of information, no signalization
In this equilibrium some but not all unsuccessful migrants …nd it worthwhile to manipulate information (q 2 ]0; 1[) and successful migrants do not signal themselves ( = 0). Income expectations
The necessary conditions for this equilibrium to exist are:
The former condition leads to the de…nition of the equilibrium probability of manipulation:
A necessary condition for this equilibrium to prevail is:
The second condition s H E sjT H < u H , is tantamount to:
In equilibrium (with q de…ned by equation 27), this condition is equivalent to:
Thus, this equilibrium exists if:
Notice that when the Hybrid equilibrium A prevails, the proportion of unsuccessful migrants choosing the manipulating strategy is given by Equation (27). It is increasing with p: the higher the frequency of successful migrants, the higher the proportion of manipulating migrants among the unsuccessful ones. However, the scope for this equilibrium to prevail decreases with the probability of success: the Hybrid equilibrium A exists only if
, and the interval narrows as p goes up.
Whether the right-hand limit for s is u L p or u depends on the frequency of successful migrants, p: We have already de…ned the critical thresholdp u
it can then be shown that the proportion of manipulating migrants is necessarily higher than
it can then be shown that the proportion of manipulating migrants is necessarily lower than the previous threshold:
The total remitted amount is:
11 Notice that T A increases with the frequency of successful migrants p, faster than T low :
While both the manipulating unsuccessful migrants and the "honest" ones have the same total utility, the manipulating ones are diminishing their immediate consumption.
Hybrid equilibrium B: total manipulation of information, partial signalization
In this equilibrium all unsuccessful migrants …nd it worthwhile to manipulate information (q = 1) and some successful migrants …nd it worthwhile to signal themselves ( 2 ]0; 1[). Residents'
. This equilibrium prevails if the following necessary conditions are ful…lled:
The …rst indi¤erence condition de…nes the equilibrium proportion of successful migrants who choose the signaling strategy:
An equilibrium exists if:
The second condition,
or, after replacing by its equilibrium value, to:
Since u > u H ; the two equilibrium conditions can be written in a compact form as:
A non-empty interval for s exists only if the frequency of successful migrants is large enough:
Notice that in the Hybrid equilibrium B the proportion of successful migrants choosing the signaling strategy is increasing with the probability of success p. It can then be shown that the proportion of signaling migrants is necessarily higher than a certain threshold: 2
Moreover, the possibility for this equilibrium to prevail increases with the probability of success:
the Hybrid equilibrium B can occur only if s < u H 1 p , and this binding value increases with p.
12 Notice that T B increases with the probability of success more than T low :
As in the Pooling equilibrium, all poor migrants play the manipulating strategy; they have no other choice than to sacri…ce their consumption utility for the sake of status-seeking.
Hybrid equilibrium C: partial manipulation, partial signalization
It can be shown that in the very special case where s = u, there is an equilibrium where some but not all unsuccessful migrants do resort to manipulation (q 2 ]0; 1[) and some but not all successful migrants carry out the signalization strategy ( 2 ]0; 1[). Income expectations are:
The necessary conditions for existence of this equilibrium are:
Summing the two former conditions, we get the existence condition:
Dividing the two conditions, we get a relationship between the equilibrium values of and q:
or, if we choose to express q as a function of (the reverse would be possible as well):
with the additional restriction q 2 ]0; 1[ and 2 ]0; 1[ : There is an in…nite number of pairs ( ; q) verifying these conditions.
Given that s = u; we can check that for = 0 (no signaling by rich migrants) we obtain the frequency of unsuccessful migrants who manipulate information such as provided by equation (27) in the case of Hybrid equilibrium A, and, for q = 1 (all unsuccessful migrants try to manipulate), we get the frequency of signaling rich migrants, such as de…ned by equation (34) in the analysis of the Hybrid equilibrium B.
In this atypical equilibrium, income expectations E sjT H are independent of the frequencies q and :
This can occur if an increase in the number of rich migrants who decide to signal themselves ( ) is matched by a reduction in the number of manipulating unsuccessful migrants (q) such that the expected income conditional on observing T H is unchanged.
In equilibrium, the total remitted amount is:
Notice that T C increases with the probability of success:
Finally, we should notice that a hybrid equilibrium with no manipulation (q = 0) and partial signalization ( 2 ]0; 1[) is impossible. Indeed, since the strategy T H signals that the migrant is successful (since no unsuccessful migrant adopts it), a successful migrant has no incentive to adopt the more expensive T S strategy.
Summary of equilibria and welfare considerations
In this paper, we have two distinct welfare measures. One pertains to total utility, the other to consumption utility, which is a component of total utility, the other component being connected to the status-seeking behavior. On purely utilitarian grounds, only total utility should be taken into account. However, in the speci…c context of our problem, one cannot neglect the fact that, in some of the equilibria, poor migrants have no other choice than to sacri…ce personal consumption (and thus personal development opportunities) only in order to comply with a form of social norm, that emerges as an aggregation of individual status-seeking behavior. Thus, when interpreting the various equilibria, a central place must be given to consumption utility. Table 1 summarizes the di¤erent equilibria, such as characterized by the equilibrium probabilities q and : The possible types depend on the frequency of successful migrants p; with respect 
We show in the Appendix that the relative position of u L and u H depends to a large extent on s. If the income di¤erential is strong, then u L > u H , and if the income di¤erential is
In the case p <p, the range of equilibria is rather narrow. Other situations of multiple equilibria can be put forward.
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As already mentioned, both the Hybrid B equilibrium and the Pooling one are extremely detrimental to poor migrants, since they all sacri…ce consumption and development opportunities in order to implement the manipulating strategy. Like in the former case, either a very small income gap or a very large one would bring about a separating situation where poor migrants do not have to bear this burden.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the game between status-seeking migrants and their origin community, when remittances are used strategically to convey some information about the migrant's economic success. Migrants di¤er with respect to their income in the host country, and this information is private. The migrant cares about his prestige, i.e. how the local community perceives his success abroad.
Our model shows that, if the income gap is large enough, unsuccessful migrants would send more money than in the perfect information set-up in order to conceal their di¢ culties. In some cases, successful migrants would remit even more, to the point where no unsuccessful migrant can follow, only in order to signal themselves as being truly successful. In general, whatever the equilibrium, the total remitted amount is higher than it would be under perfect information. The counterpart of this extreme generosity is a self-immisering situation of the migrants. One main limitation of our analysis is its static character. In a dynamic perspective, the cost of undergone consumption and development opportunities should be higher, while status has a more ephemeral dimension. In this case, the scope for both manipulation on behalf of poor migrants and signaling on behalf of successful migrants would narrow.
Among the various types of equilibria, some of them are characterized by extreme impoverishment of the least successful migrants. Policy recommendations should target this category, and prevent them from adopting immisering strategies. We have shown that either a small income gap or a very large one would lead to the desired outcome; however, the former outcome (reducing the income gap) not only has better ethical foundations, but can also be reached in a natural way by policies that support migrants'integration.
For a broad range of parameters, the game presents multiple equilibria. For instance, the pooling and the high separating equilibrium can both exist, and which one will actually arise depends on the equilibrium beliefs of the residents. Hence, it should not be surprising to observe that remitting strategies di¤er from one group of migrants to another, although they live in the same developed host country, have similar preferences and the same income gap. Clark & Drinkwater (2007) carry out a comprehensive study on the decision to remit of migrants in England and Whales; they point out that signi…cant ethnic di¤erences in the incidence of remitting subside even after controlling for the main observable characteristics. For instance, Caribbeans have a probability of remitting 19% higher than Indians, and only 18% of this (3.2 percentage points)
can be explained by observable di¤erences such as income or education. In the light of our analysis, such an outcome can be explained if we agree on that each ethnic group has developed his own set of beliefs.
Several microeconomic studies on migrants'remittances mention a negative impact of the duration of migration on remitted amounts (Johnson & Whitelaw, 1974; Banerjee, 1985; Funkhouser, 1995) . In other words, as migration lengthens, remittances decrease. The main explanation of this phenomenon is the decaying of altruism through time, according to the saying "out of sight, out of mind". Our analysis suggests an alternative explanation not involving the progressive disappearance of altruism. Indeed, we show that as long as his home community does not know his real economic situation, a migrant may …nd it worthwhile to remit more than he would if information were perfect, in order to dissimulate his failure or signal his success in the host country. Yet, it seems natural to assume that as migration lengthens, the asymmetry of information decreases as the family receives other information on the migrant's economic position. After a while, his situation in the host country becomes public information. Once the migrant's true economic situation is revealed, there is no reason for the manipulating and signaling strategies and remitting amounts are adjusted downward even if the migrant still have the same altruistic feelings towards his family.
If we carry this reasoning one step further, any reform able to reduce the asymmetry of information between migrants and their origin community should contribute to improve the migrants' consumption utility. There is no miracle solution able to achieve this result. It seems logical to assume that members of the origin community can better observe a migrant's economic achievements if they can visit him frequently in the host country. Hence the reduction in telecommunications or in travelling costs, including the removal of administrative barriers, should go in the right direction.
14 For sure, this simple model cannot claim to provide a comprehensive explanation of the decision to remit. However, it contributes to the literature on remittances by emphasizing the impact that social norms and status-seeking behavior have on migrants' remitting strategy and on the total amount remitted.
